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TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND THE DOCTOR-PATIENT 
RELATIONSHIP 
AmyL. Wax 
Professor Elhauge's main thesis is that technology assessment is un-
likely to slow the cost explosion in health care. 1 Ideally, technology as-
sessment would identify unnecessary, ineffective, or excessively expen-
sive methods for treating or evaluating illness, or for delivering health 
care. But, according to Professor Elhauge, technology assessment does 
not prove useful in altering the patterns of consumption of medical care 
or in reducing inefficiencies. Significant savings cannot be achieved over 
the long run by wringing "waste" from the system, and neither elimina-
tion of medically useless therapies nor the development of more efficient 
methods of treatment or delivery of care will reduce the inexorable cost 
escalation that has been a feature of our medical care system for decades. 
Rather, significant control of health care costs will require moving be-
yond a quest for mere efficiency-the achievement of the most benefit 
for the least cost-to medical rationing, which entails trading off real 
health care benefits. 2 
According to Professor Elhauge, the route to cost savings through 
·Professor of Law, Unive rsity of Virginia School of Law. I am grateful for the able 
research assistance of Eliza Platts-Mills . 
' Einer Elhauge, The Limited Potential of T ech nology Assessment, 82 Va_ L. Rev. 1525 
(1996). Professor Elhauge distinguishes purely ·'informational" technology assessment 
fr om "regulatory" technology assessment. He describes '·regulatory " technology 
assessment as the process of using information to allocate health care resources. 
"Informational" technology assessment is the process of gathering systematic data about 
the benefits and costs of medical therapies , techniques, and treatment strategies. See id. 
at 1527-29. Medical technology assessment, or a component of what Professor Elhauge 
refers to as "informational" technology assessment, typically takes the form of "outcomes 
research," which involves "examining large amounts of data abo ut rates of various 
outcomes given various treatments " in well-defined populations of patients. Fred Gifford, 
Outcomes Research and Practice Guidelines: Upstream Issues for Downstream Users, 
Hastings Ctr. Rpt. , Mar.-Apr. 1996 , at 38 , 38. It requires "statistical analyses of outcome 
data drawn from very large data bases." !d. These include data se ts generated specificall,y 
for the purpose of evaluating the th e rapies at issue, as well as pre-existing data 
compilations in the form of company records, insurance files , or hospital charts. Id. a t 38-
39; see a lso Sandra J. Tanenbaum , Knowing and Acting in Medical Prac tice: The 
Epistemological Politics of Outcomes Research, 19 J. H ealth Po l. Pol'y & L. 27 (1994). 
2 Elhauge, supra note 1, at 1546-47. I use the te rm "medical rationing" in reference to 
Professor Elhauge 's notion that if there is to be a reducti on in the ever-increasing po rtion 
of national wealth devoted to med ical care, some patients within the system must sacrifice 
some degree of the well-be ing that could be achieved by providing all potentially available 
care. 
1641 
1642 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 82:1641 
medical rationing is effectively blocked by the absolutist paradigm, which 
mandates that no patient be denied any treatment known to be medically 
beneficial, however marginal the benefit or however great the cost. This 
absolutist imperative has a firm grip on the medical establishment, Pro-
fessor Elhauge contends, and is re lentlessly enforced by a variety of pow-
erful forces and institutional a?ents, operating on multiple levels within 
the existing health care system. Against this dominant paradigm, Profes-
sor Elhauge argues, technology assessment is virtually useless . The 
problem of exploding health care costs sterns not from lack of informa-
tion-which is what technology assessment is designed to provide-but 
from other factors, such as the inability to agree on the morality and de-
sirability of rationing, the lack of a coherent and unproblematic protocol 
for allocating limited medical resources, and the absence of a workable 
institutional framework for enforcing a comprehensive rationing scherne. 4 
In challenging Professor Elhauge 's view of the potential for technol-
ogy assessment to achieve cost control, I begin with our points of agree-
ment. I accept, for purposes of this Comment, that if rationing means 
that someone, somewhere, will forgo at least some possibility of medical 
benefit,' then some kind of rationing-as opposed to mere "waste" re-
duction-is probably necessary to arrest the relentless inflation of health 
care costs. There is also no denying that the absolutist rnindset-which 
opposes planned limits on individuals ' access6 to treatment that is be-
J See Elhauge, supra no te 1, at 1537-38. 
" Id . at 1526-31 . 
5 Of course, defining rationing as the relinquishmen t of some "known" medical benefit is 
not very informative, because the medical effects of eve n commonly used therapies can be 
estimated only by observing probabilities in populations that can pote ntially be 
categorized, subdivided, a nd tested in many different ways. The categories of "known" 
be nefit , " possible" benefit , and "unknown" benefit are best thought of as points on a 
constantly fluctuating continuum that is a function both of the observed effects of a 
treatment in pa rticular populations and of how much information has been gathered in 
populations of differe nt size and characte ris tics. The size of the population studied is 
particularly critical to the ability to meas ure e ffects of therapies: for example, benefits that 
do not show up in a sma ll e r population may be revealed in a !arger o ne. As a rough rule 
of thumb-and one that inev ita bl y piggybacks o n the somewhat arbitrary conventions of 
epidemiology-! would define the possibility of benefit as coextensive with a statistically 
significant chance of observing a measurable effect (however small) in some patients 
within a popula ti on of th e size usu a ll y considered adeq ua te to eva luate the e fficacy of a 
pa rticular therapy. Take n to its ex treme, the abso lutist paradigm would require that a 
treat ment be made avai labl e even if th e re was a very small chance o f conferring a 
minimal , but statistica lly detectable, benefit on a few persons in a large targe t popula tion 
with a particular conditio n. Such a be ne fit co uld be desc ribed in many different ways. 
There is a " rea l" o r "k nown" benefit in the se nse that someone in the target population 
can be expected to experience some pos itive e ffect , however minima l. But, the benefit is 
" uncerta in," or even " unlike ly, " to the ex tent that o nly a very sma ll number of patients 
will respond, th e response is sma ll , a nd th e patients cannot be identified a head of time. 
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lieved to present some chance of medical benefit, however remote 7-
holds considerable sway in the health care community. 
Beyond those major areas of agreement, I must part company with 
Professor Elhauge. Here I speak primarily as a physician and former 
practitioner-as someone who has done time "down on the ground"-
rather than as a legal scholar or a theorist of health care delivery systems. 
I disagree with Professor Elhauge's central conclusion that technology 
assessment is useless against the influence of the absolutist paradigm that 
pervades the health care establishment. On the contrary, technology as-
sessment has a vital role to play in helping to subvert the hostility to-
wards cost-benefit tradeoffs. 
The choice of the word "subvert" is quite deliberate. As Professor El-
hauge has explored elsewhere, the task of formulating, justifying and set-
ting up a comprehensive system of rationing presents overwhelming 
challenges of justification and coordination.8 It is virtually impossible to 
devise a fully satisfying and theoretically coherent rationing system that is 
completely consistent with all our principles and moral commitments. 
Therefore, the idea of rationing has come to acquire a bad name among 
philosophers, analysts and health care experts, and is unpopular with 
health care decision makers who are charged with publicly justifying their 
allocational decisions (such as university medical centers, governmental 
policymakers and judges). 
I submit, however, that these theoretical tensions have simply pushed 
rationing underground: It is practiced covertly or informally, defying the 
uncompromising claims of absolutism in small and subtle ways. Ration-
ing governs practice far more than express theoretical commitments, and 
hence is the purview of those who function on the "front lines" of the sys-
tem. The day-to-day business of placing limits on care is an ad hoc, de-
centralized, piecemeal, informal , intermittent, intensely local and often 
erratic phenomenon-which makes it hard to discuss, difficult to demon-
strate , and almost impossible to survey and quantify. Providing definitive 
evidence of the existence and extent of actual rationing, therefore, is not 
easy. It is the task of an empiricist, not a theoretician. It is the job of a 
medical sociologist or anthropologist, not a philosopher or professor of 
that risk future detrimental effects on pe rsons who cannot be identified ahead of time-
;o-ca lled stati s tical lives-than it is o f all ocative me thods that de ny ca re to specified 
indi vidua ls who are known to be in immedi a te need of medical interve ntion. See Elhauge, 
;upra note 1, a t 1570. 
' Because th e concept of medical benefit is inextricably bo und up with consid e rations of 
mce rtainty and risk , the meaning of th e phras e "some chance of medical be nefit ," is open 
.o debat e-a debat e that is re flect ed in the literature regarding the definition of medical 
·utility. See supra note 5 , and infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
' Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Ca re Morall y, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1449 (1994) 
here inafte r Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Mora lly] . 
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law. The premise of this Comment-which must provisionally be taken 
on faith-is that rationing goes on every day in the practice of medicine, 
in a form that presents real tradeoffs between costs and benefits. Arm-
chair analysis can only take us so far in satisfying those who may be skep-
tical of this premise . 
Thus, the rationing I describe and discuss in this Comment differs from 
the rationing with which Professor Elhauge has been primarily concerned 
in his role as a legal scholar and student of the health care system. In his 
previous work, Professor Elhauge has been preoccu~ied with centralized, 
bureaucratic, "top-down" mechanisms of rationing. This is understand-
able, since he has set out to devise and justify a comprehensive system for 
allocating health care resources. In accomplishing this project, he neces-
sarily seeks theoretical consistency, which requires examining transys-
temically all decisions made for all patients within a complete and closed 
system of care. 
While any fully rigorous and theoretically satisfying rationing system 
must be global , most real-world rationing remains firmly local. In a re-
cent piece, 10 Professor Mark Hall describes the complexity and character 
of real-world rationing, and offers a defense of physicians' practice of 
limiting, forgoing, or delaying potentially beneficial care of individual pa-
tients on a case-by-case basis-a practice he terms "bedside rationing." 11 
How does rationing at the bedside work? The key is that it is uncoordi-
nated, sporadic and informal. It is accomplished through the type of 
messy, ad hoc decision-making that physicians and patients engage in 
every day. 
The ideal of quality care has come to be equated with care that is tai-
lored to the individual patient, but in a way that is fully cognizant of 
sound scientific principles. Indeed, it is unlikely that medical care that 
departs from this model can be, or has ever been, considered good. De-
cisions concerning the provision, intensity and duration of care are rou-
tinely made on a highly individualized basis, in conjunction with, and af-
ter consultation with, patients and their families. The model of 
individualized care, although not without potentially serious drawbacks 
and temptations (such as its ever-present invitation to an unrigorous an-
ecdotal approach), also opens the door to rationing of a very modest and 
discreet kind . That rationing takes the form of "the prudent trimming of 
' Id. at 1493-1502, 1508-26. 
10 Mark A. Hall, Rationing H ealth Care at the Bedside, 69 N Y.U L Rev. 693 (1994). 
11 ld. at 699. For another defense of physician-implemented limits on care, see David 
Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial incentives to Limit Care , 30 U. 
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incrementally beneficial services, " 12 rather than of stark and wrenching 
choices between the use or outright denial of clearly lifesaving treatment. 
Bedside rationing is best characterized as a method of responding to the 
day-to-day need to make small decisions in an atmosphere of partial un-
certainty and speculative possibilities, rather than as an intentional relin-
quishment of the precisely defined benefits of well-understood methods. 
Bedside rationing is a creature of the conservatism that is one very im-
portant element of the cluster of values and norms that inform the prac-
tice of medicine. It is a by-product of a cautious, less intensely interven-
tionist practice style that still retains a significant degree of influence 
within the profession. It balances tradition, local convention, and trust in 
clinical judgment against the all-out reliance on expensive new technolo-
gies. In mapping out strategies that present some risk of forgoing medi-
cal benefit, as Professor H all puts it , "[c]ost-benefit trade-offs [are] 
largely subliminal in physicians' thought processes," 13 rather than overtly 
considered. Cost considerations are unconsciously internalized as one of 
many factors bearing on the choice of particular treatment strategies. A 
pronounced disproportion between cost and benefit might subtly sway 
the decision-making process. Certainly, cost considerations help shape 
many physicians' sense of the appropriate pace and aggressiveness of ap-
proach to particular medical or diagnostic problems. 
In sum, financial considerations probably influence medical decision -
making "on the ground," but their influence is imperfect, fluctuating, and 
indirect. Cost pressures and concerns find expression through evolving 
traditions and conventions of accepted practice, rather than through the 
rigid imposition of explicit rules which would mark the type of central-
ized rationing regime with which Professor Elhauge is most directly con-
cerned. 
That cost considerations do come into play should come as no surprise . 
The habits of practicing physicians have evolved in practice settings in 
which resources have often been limited. The widespread availability of 
health insurance is a phenomenon barely fifty years old in this country. 14 
There are approximately forty-two million _uninsured persons in the 
United States, according to a recent report. 1) Physicians must routinely 
cope with the limitations imposed by the difficulty of paying for care. 
The internalized habits of restraint, which remain useful in dealing with 
I? Hall, supra no te 10, a t 712. 
u ld. at 713. 
'"See He rman M. So mers & Anne R . Some rs, Doctors, Patie nts, and Hea lth Insuran ce 
10-11 ( 1961 ) . 
'' See E. Richa rd Brown , Data Watch: Tre nds in Hea lth Insurance Coverage ln 
Califo rnia , 1989-1 993, H ealth Aff., Spring 1996, at 11 8, 120. 
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uninsured patients, carry forward traditions from an era when few had 
medical insurance and cost was a factor in most patients' care.
16 
Even to-
day, educational practice, local custom, and peer pressure continue to 
foster those traditions to some extent, shaping those notions of wise or 
prudent medical care. Recent cost-cutting imperatives, fueled by institu-
tional changes that favor fixed-fee over fee-for-service forms of reim-
bursement, are likely to reinforce, rather than extinguish, the conserva-
tive habits that retain influence in some quarters, even in the face of the 
relentless escalation in the expectations for care that have been fueled by 
countervailing forces. 17 To be sure, conventions of practice are in con-
16 To be sure, the costs of ro utin e medical care were far less o nerous for the average 
pe rson before the insu rance era. There a lso were far fewer treatment options. But it is 
important to reme mbe r that basic tene ts of med ical e thics and practice were established at 
a time when the majority of patients paid for medica l care out of their own pockets. 
17 Traditional fee-for-s e rvice medicine provides few incentives for physicians to limit 
care, a nd rewards physicians for providing physician-based services. Since physicians 
receive rei mburse men t for each service provided, they enhance personal income only by 
providing more services. See Ore ntlicher, supra note 11, at 158. Moreover , fee-for -
service patients ··are not very discriminating purchasers of health care ," nor do they have 
much incentive to limit th e ir consumption of medical services. Id. at 188-89. It is widely 
accepted that the combination of fee-for-service medicine and coverage base d on 
"medical necessity" is a sure formula for cost explosion. The inflationary pressure is 
greatest for pa ti ents covered by hea lth insurance plans that are highly deferential to th e 
physician's judgment of what is "medically necessary" care. Such plans dominated the 
sce ne during the first few decades of the post-war period , and influenced the initial design 
of Medicare. See Judith M. Feder, Medicare: The Politics of Federal Hospital Insurance 
53-57 (1977). 
Fee-for-se rvice medicine has gradually given way to fixed-fee arrangements for 
delive ring health care (although fee-for-serv ice remains an important fixture of th e 
medical scene, albeit in more cost-conscious forms). Private health maintenance 
organizations (" HMOs") typically pay physicians by a capitation method (a set amount for 
every patient seen or cared for) or by a fixed salary. HMO compensation methods were 
designed to mute the incentive to provide additional, possibly unwarranted , care that 
existed under a fee-for-service regime. HMO compensation methods accomplish this goal 
only imperfectly and at the cost o f c re ating a different set of po tentially perverse 
incentives. For example, payme nt by way of fixed salary may lead a physician to see fewer 
patients or to spend less time with them , since the ph ysician receives the sa me payment 
regardless of how hard he works. Capitation places a pre mium on seeing as many patie nts 
as poss ible, decreasing the time spent with each. Further , "[e]ven with th e ir built-in 
incentive to limit care, pure salary and capita tion may not provide sufficient ince ntive for 
physicians to limit the costs of care provided to th e ir patients." Orentlicher, supra note 
11, at 159. Under both arrangements, physicians may seek to sa tisfy th e ir patients by 
"a lter(ing] the mix of services provided," id. , in a way th at reli es less on th e primary 
physician's attention, and mo re o n a ncillary se rvices such as sophis ticate d tes ts, 
complicat ed and protracted therapies, or specialty care. See id. at 159-60. The e nd result 
could well be an increase rather than a decrease in overa ll costs. 
T o counteract these tend e nci es and minimize ph ysic ians ' use of a ncillary se rvices, health 
care plans have reli ed on other devices such as bonuses, fee withholds, or expanded 
capitation. See id. at 160 (outlining the mechanics o f th ese dev ices). The common feature 
in these payment me thods is that the physici a n stands to earn more by limiting patients' 
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stant flux, and it is difficult to assess the relative salience of different 
strands of professional tradition in setting the standards of care. It is rea-
sonable to expect that even physicians who are most insulated from cost 
constraints (like fee-for-servi ce physicians treating fully-insured patients) 
are not wholly immune to the influe nce of physicians who operate under 
greater cost constraints. The point is that medical practice is not a 
monolith . Moreover, the changes and upheavals now underway in the 
organization of health care may foment additional, as yet unknown, shifts 
in the grass-roots balance of culture and influence that determine the 
standards and methods of medical practice. 
It is not possible to address here the difficult question of whether bed-
side rationing in any of its various forms can be defended. 18 Rather, the 
point of this Comment is that any credible commentary on the role of 
technology assessment must accept that the actual hold of the absolutist 
hospita liza tions , a nd diagnostic tests. 
'
8 Bedside rat io ning is hi ghl y controversia l. It has bee n conde mned as unworkable, 
un e thi ca l, a nd theore tically indefens ible. See Elhauge , Allocating H ea lth Ca re Morally, 
supra note 8, a t 1465-72 (reviewing arg ume nt s critical of bedside rationing); Hall, supra 
note 10, a t 703-11 (same). Critics of physician-based rationing re ly o n many of the same 
arguments that are directed at instituti ona l and rule-based schemes, a nd raise additional 
objections tha t are specific to ph ys icia n-directed limitations on care, including the 
pote ntial conflict of interest created by the physicians' paramount ob ligation to vindicate 
the interes ts of th e patient and to use best medical judgmen t, a nd the inability of 
individual physicians to take cognizance of sys temic concerns of fairness and comparati ve 
need . See , e.g. , H a ll , supra note 10, a t 703-05 & nn.31-32 (reviewing opposition to bedside 
rati o ning based on concern about the physician 's role in the rationing decision ); 
Orentlicher , supra note 11 , at 165 (acknowledging that under a physic ian-based rationing 
regime, " there would be a great deal of inco nsistency from physician to physician," and 
that trea tm e nt deci sions might " turn more on the personal views of the patient's physician 
than o n any overa rching rationing principles"). 
Attempts by health care provide r orga nizat ions, such as HMOs, to create financial 
incentives for physicians to limit care have e ncountered particularly adama nt opposition. 
See , e.g., D avid M. Frankford, Managing Medical Clinicians ' Work Through the Use of 
Financia l Incentives , 29 Wake Fores t L. Rev. 71 (1994) (concluding tha t the use of 
fin anc ia l incentives is likely to result in increased conflict rather than grea te r control); 
David Mechanic , Professional Judgmen t and th e R a tioning of Medical Care , 140 U. Pa. L. 
R ev. 1713 , 1748 (1992) ("[p]ersonal remunera ti on arra ngeme nts tha t improperly modify 
me dical dec ision-making by providing economic incentives to doctors to withhold services 
should be prohibited"); Orentliche r, supra no te 11 , a t 161 -62 (d isc ussing critiques tha t 
characterize the use of financial incentives to limit care as a threa t to patient welfare and a 
violat ion of the fiduciary nature of th e physician-patient re la tions hi p) ; Daniel P. Sulmasy, 
Ph ys ic ia ns, Cost Control, and Eth ics , 116 Annals Internal Me d. 920, 923-24 ( 1992) 
(cri tique of arg uments in fav or of fina ncia l incentive contro l); see a lso Steffie 
Wool ha ndler & David U. Himmelstei n, Ex treme Risk-The New Corpora te Proposition 
for Physicians, 333 New Eng. J. Me d. 1706 (1995) (expressing fe a r of a nticipa ted ill effects 
from HMO cost-consciousness). But cf. Hall, supra note 10, at 706 ("A divergent wing of 
less absolutist physicians and ethicists are more acco mmodating to bedside rationing.") & 
n.37 (co ll ecting so urces of support of this position by e thicists); Orentlicher , supra note 11, 
at 156-58 , 192-97 (argu ing in fav or of phys ician-based rati oning a nd fin anc ia l incentives to 
limit medical ca re) . 
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paradigm, although formidable, is less than absolute, because bedside ra-
tioning remains an important force in medicine today. My thesis is that 
technology assessment has a vital role to play in nouri shing and main-
taining the practice of bedside rationing , and in insuring that the practice 
is not abused. Absolutists find all forms of rationing unacceptable , but 
even those who defend the practice recognize that abuses are possible . 1 ~ 
I submit that the most important source of arbitrary and indefensibl e 
limi ts on care is ignorance, and it is technology assessment 's role to re-
duce ignorance. 
To understand how technology assessment could encourage physician-
based rationing of the most benign form, one must accept three impor-
tant propositions about the real world of medicine. First, when cost-
benefit tradeoffs are made in actual medical practice, they are often 
based not on accurate information but on intuition, prejudice , anecdote, 
or unsubstantiated lore . Care-limiting decisions that are informed by 
medical outcomes data generated through technology assessment- which 
I would term " well-informed rationing"- are comparatively rare. Sec-
ond , most instances of rationing will be confined to "cutting corners" o r 
forgo ing treatment "at the margins. " That is, a decision not to do "every-
thing possible" (at least not all at once) , will usually be made because the 
physician and patient believe that the benefits of the interventions at is-
sue will be modest or quite uncertain , or that the possible advantages will 
be counterbalanced by the threat of signifi cant complications o r side ef-
fects. Third , as Professor Elhauge himse lf ack nowledges ,
20 
much recent 
new medical technology and innovation- both in diagnosis and treat-
me nt- is of small marginal benefit compared with existing methods. 
Methods that save or dramatically improve the life of all those afflicted 
with a particular life-threatening disease are now few and far betwee n ." 
Positive effects will be seen in only a few patients within the target group, 
and these effects will be of modest magnitude or transient duration . 
Rarely do new therapies present the beneficial equivalent of penicillin , 
insulin or appendectomy. That is not to say that there are no significant 
2' advances whatsoever. · For whatever reason, however, most progress 
,., Defenders include Professo rs Hall and Orentli cher. See Hall , supra note 10; 
Orentlicher, supra note II . 
2" Elhauge, supra note I , at 1546 (arguing that the hea lth care sys tem has rece ntly made 
"a lot more care ava il ab le with a high cost relative to it s benefit "). 
" The reason for this tr end is unclear. It may be tha t medical science has tackl ed th e 
"easy" problems , so that onl y the complex and difficult ones remain. For a di sc uss ion of 
poss ible factors behind the slowing of scientific progress, see ge nerally John Horgan, The 
End of Science: Facing the Limits of Knowl edge in the Twilight of the Scientific Age 
(1996). 
" The drug ta xo l. for example. has made a significa nt difference in prognosis and qua lit v 
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now comes in slow increments, and new agents usually offer very small 
marginal gains .
23 
And those benefits are often purchased at extravagant 
cost. Most new drugs are expensive, due in large part to the prolonged 
and risky process of development, and the elaborate and extensive clini-
cal testing required to satisfy Food and Drug A dministration (FDA) 
standards of safety and efficacy.
24 
The protections afforded by the patent 
system and other legislation designed to shelter investment and reward 
innovation25 combine with the demands of new drug development to 
drive up the cost of even the most marginally useful treatments . 
· There are many examples of new medical technologies for which cost 
is extremely high , and benefit is slight, marginal or unproven. For exam-
ple, in treating metastatic breast cancer, the use of bone marrow trans-
plantation is extremely expensive, potentially traumatic and risky. Virtu-
ally every well-controlled study has failed to show that the treatment has 
any statistically significant effect on duration of survival. 2" Similarly, a 
of life for patients with ovarian cancer. See Monroe E. Wall & Mansukh C. Wani , 
Camptothecin and Taxol: Discovery to Clinic-Thirteenth Bruce F. Ca in Memorial 
Award Lecture , 55 Cancer Res. 753, 757 (1995) (citing " numerous observat ions of partial 
and complete remission of advanced ovarian cancer in women"). Despite the 
proliferation of new drugs and treatment protoco ls , the pace of progress for many forms of 
cancer has been disappointing. See D av id Plorkin, Good News a nd Bad News About 
Breast Cancer, Atlantic Monthly, June 1996, a t 53; see also John Re nnie & Ricki Rustin g, 
Making Headway against Cancer, Scientific Am., Sept. 1996, at 56. See ge nerally What 
You Need to Know About Cancer, Scientific Am. (Special Issue) , Sept. 1996. 
' 3 For examples of the small marginal benefits that new agents offer , see infra notes 26-
28 and accompanying text. 
'J See, e.g., Ke nneth I. Kaitin, Michael Manocchia, Mark Seibring & Lo uis Lasagna , The 
New Drug Approvals of 1990, 1991, and 1992: Trends in Drug Deve lopme nt, 34 1. Clinical 
Pharmacology 120, 125-27 (1994) (discussing delays in FDA approval of ne w drugs); see 
also Ke nneth I. Kaitin , Nancy Mattison, Frances K. Northington & Louis Lasagna, The 
Drug Lag: An Update of New Drug Introductions in the Un ited States and in the United 
Kingdom, 1977 through 1987, 46 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 121, 133 tbl. x 
(1989) (charting the United States' lag behind the United Kingdom in introducing 
endocrine age nts); Patricia J. Kenney, The Orpha n Drug Act-Is it a Barrier to 
Innovation? Does it Create Unintended Windfalls?, 43 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 667, 667-68 
(1988) (citing the assertion made by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association that 
the average new drug takes ten years and costs over 100 milli on dollars to bring to 
market ). 
25 See Drug Price Competition and Pate nt Term Res to rati on Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, 98 Stat. 1584 (1984) (extending patent life on se lec ted brand-name drugs); 21 
U.SC. ~ 360bb(a)(2) (1994) (defining rare diseases as dise ases affecting less than 200,000 
persons in the United States, or diseases affecting more than 200,000 people in the United 
States, but for which there is no reasonable expectation that the cos t of making the drug 
will be recovered in sales of the drug in the United States); see al so Kenney , supra note 
25, at 668 (arguing tha t to enco urage the development of drugs for rare diseases, eco nomic 
incentives are needed). 
26 See , e.g., Thomas J. Smith , Bruce E . Hi liner & Christopher E. Desch, Efficacy and 
Cost-Effectiveness of Ca nce r Treatment: Rational Allocation of Resources Based on 
Decision Analysis , 85 J. Nat'! Cance r Inst. 1460, 1468 (1993) ("·the re are no randomized 
clinical trial data confirming that thi s therapy is more effective than standard treatment" ); 
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number of drugs recently approved by the FDA show modest, short-lived 
or ambiguous effects. Demonstrating that these drugs have any benefit 
whatsoever requires trials of many thousands of patients. Scientists must 
conduct sophisticated and sometimes problematic statistical analyses in 
an often unsuccessful attemgt to identify subgroups of patients who 
might be helped by the drug. W ith respect to diagnostic techniques the 
situation is not much different. New scanners, screening techniques, and 
blood tests significantly add to medical expenditures overall, but fre-
quently present only a marginal improvement over existing methods, 
provide a net health benefit that is very difficult to measure , or have a 
high error rate that confounds their usefulness. 28 
see also Mark A. H a ll & Gerard F. Anderson, H e alth Insurers' Assessment of Medical 
Necessity, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1637, 1637-38 n.3 (1992) (c iting studi es). 
27 Recent examples demonstrating this phenomenon include Betaseron fo r multipl e 
sclerosis , see Anne Allen, The High-Stakes Drug Drawing, 9 J. Post Anesthesia Nursing 
52, 53 (1994) (desc ribing the time-intensive process required for FDA approval o f 
Betaseron for multiple sc leros is); Inter leukin-2 for renal cell cance r, see B. Escudier, 
Immunotherapie dans le cancer du re in metasta tique [Immunotherapy for Metastatic 
Re nal Ce ll Cance r], 24 La Presse Med icale 1504, 1504 (1995) (emphas izi ng the need to 
continue rigorous clinical tri a ls of interleukin-2 as a treatment for metasta tic renal cell 
cance r); granulocyte- mac rophage colony-stimulating factors ("GM-CSF ") for low blood 
counts associa ted with AIDS and cancer, see Regis T Costello, Therapeutic Use of 
Granulocyte-Macrophage Colony-Stimulating Factor ( G M-CSF): A review of recent 
experience, 32 Acta Oncologica 403, 406 (1993) (concluding that the full benefits of G M-
CSF in cancer th e rapy have still to be prove n, a nd that the drugs' "effective benefit has to 
be very ca refu ll y evaluated befor e extensive use of such sophisticated and expe nsi ve 
th erapy"); Tacrin e fo r a lzhei me r 's disease, see M. Lynn Crismon, Tacrine: First Drug 
Approved for Alzheimer's Disease, 28 A nna ls Pharmacotherapy 744 (1994) (arguing tha t 
despite FDA approval of T acrin e for treatme nt of Alzheimer's disease, clinically 
meaningful effec ts have not been de monstra ted) ; Gina Ko lata, Hopes Are R osy on 
Alzheimer's , But Results Slim , N.Y. Times , Jul y 30, 1996, at Cl , C3 (describing the "one 
drug on the market [Tacrine ]" for Alzheimer's disease as " marginall y effective a t bes t" ); 
Prosca r for benign prosta tic hype rtroph y, see Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. Study Compares 
Merits of Leading Prostate Drugs, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22 , 1996, at A18 (re porting on a 
clinical stud y showing that Proscar, which trea ts the symptoms of benign prostatic 
hypertrophy, " is no better than a dumm y pill or placebo"); and tP A for post-heart a ttac k 
coronary artery atherosclerotic blockage, see Robert McNutt & Arthur Evans, 
Accelerated tPA versus Streptokinase for Suspected Myocard ia l Infarct ion: Waiting for 
o ur Mountain Dew, 15 Med. Decisio n Making 395 (1995) (clai ming tha t ex tensive clinica l 
tri a ls that compare responses to tPA and to th e less expe nsi ve drug streptokinase a re of 
minimal benefit when making decisions about individua l pa ti ents with characte risti cs 
different from th e trial group). 
28 See, e.g. , Alvin I. Mushlin & Lo u Fintor, Is Screenin g for Breast Cance r Cost-
Effective? , 69 Cance r 1957 ( 1992) (em phas izing the need fo r cost-benefit analyses of 
breast cancer screening programs); David M. Eddy, Victo r Hasselblad , Willi am McGivney 
& William Hendee, The Value of Mam mography Scre eni ng in Women U nder Age 50 
Years, 259 J AMA 1512 (1988) (de ta iling the costs a nd benefits of ma mmography for 
wo me n under 50); see a lso Margaret T e mpero , R a nda ll Brand , Kare n Holdeman & 
Aurelio Matamoros, New Imaging T ec hniques in Colorectal Cance r, 22 Seminars in 
Oncology 448 (1995) (reviewi ng the use of radio immunod iagnos is , e ndoscopic and 
intraopera ti ve ultrasound, magnetic resonance imagi ng (MRI), and positron emission 
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Careful, accurate, and sophisticated outcomes assessment is the best, 
and indeed , the only reliable way to identify and measure the magnitude 
of the costs and benefits of many new therapies. Even under the most 
rigorous and well-controlled circumstances , it is technically very difficult 
to quantify with any confidence the effects of innovations that represent 
only marginal improvements over existing techniques or interventions. 
Necessarily, measurements are subject to various kinds of error and re -
quire assumptions that render them little more than best estimates. 
These observations apply not just to innovative therapies , but also to es-
tablished treatments, some of which will also be of questionable or mar-
ginal value in some or all patients who have received treatment. 
But, even with all of its imperfections and difficulties, technology as-
sessment's irreplaceable role in documenting the cost-benefit ratio makes 
the technique vitally important to the optimal operation of bedside ra-
tioning. Technology assessment allows conscientious physicians to think 
through the possible approaches to diagnosis and treatment in a system-
atic and informed manner, rather than relying on intuition, anecdote and 
limited personal experience. Armed with information about medical 
benefit, efficacy, side effects and overall expense, physicians who have a 
scientifically sound understanding of the likely costs and effects of treat-
ment choices can formulate more reasoned treatment plans for individual 
patients in the least harmful and most cost-effective way. 
I submit, however, that the key to technology assessment's pivotal role 
in fostering informed limits on care lies not with the physician , but with 
the patient. Although sound information is obviously important in per-
mitting physicians to make more informed judgments, it is even more im-
portant in enabling a physician to present the basis for his or her judg-
ment in a way that is likely to gain the assent and cooperation of patients. 
To the extent that the information provided by technology assessment 
has the power to foster a reduction in the consumption of medical re-
sources, it will do so mainly by creating the conditions under which pa-
tients are more likely to go along with reasonable restraints on the provi-
sion of care . All too often, the non-specific demand that health care 
providers "do everything possible" is a manifestation of ignorance and 
fear rather than reasoned decision-making based on knowledge and con-
crete information. Without precise data about costs and benefits, pa-
tients will be frightened by the inestimable possibility that a chosen path 
will sacrifice significant palliation or cure. Patients are more likely to ac-
cept tradeoffs and risks when their physician 's recommendations are 
backed by the rigorous, trustworthy, and precise scientific estimates of 
costs and benefits that outcomes assessment data can provide. And not 
continuing need for cost-benefit analys is). 
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only does technology assessment enable physicians to provide patients 
with convincing and precise evidence of the marginality of the benefits 
offered by many cutting-edge treatments , but it also allows physicians to 
pinpoint areas of uncertainty and to advise patients about what is known 
and unknown concerning the effects of new and existing options. If pa-
tients can be made to appreciate the (sometimes flimsy) scientific basis 
for some interventions, they may go along more readily with recommen-
dations that certain particularly expensive therapies or procedures be 
forgone or put off. 
Some examples show how information technology can foster patient-
physician joint decision-making that resolves towards less rather than 
more interventionist care . Mark Hall illustrates the kind of bottom-up 
rationing that frequently occurs in practice by offering a hypothetical 
based loosely on a p~1sician ' s handling of a knee injury his wife received 
while playing tennis : H e states that his wife's physician estimated that 
there was a ninety percent chance that the injury was a ligament strain 
(ordinarily treated by resting the affected limb) , and a ten percent chance 
that the injury was a more severe ligament tear, which in turn had a ten 
percent chance of leading to permanent impairment if left untreated . 
The most definitive resolution of the diagnostic uncertainty would have 
been to perform a magnetic resonance imaging scan (costing twelve hun-
dred dollars) immediately. The physician, after consulting with the pa-
tient, decided against ordering the scan. A quick recovery proved the 
gamble harmless. 
As Hall points out, this situation does not present the kind of dramatic 
life-or-death dilemma that dominates the rationing literature. The reality 
is far less riveting. Through his hypothetical, Hall attempts to provide a 
more realistic picture of the small, incremental and routine decisions that 
physicians make every day-decisions like "declining to order a con-
firming diagnostic test or an extra day in the hospital, prescribing a less 
expensive drug, or avoiding a referral to a specialist. "3° For each of these 
decisions, the stakes are comparatively small for individual patients, but 
the costs of indulging extreme risk aversion at every point add up in the 
aggregate to significantly greater expense for the system. 
Hall's example also illustrates that it is a mistake to think of every 
medical judgment that can be characterized as not doing everything pos-
sible as a sharp departure from norms of acceptable medical practice. 
First, in most routine cases of medical diagnosis and tre atment, it is not 
readily apparent precisely what doing everything possible would mean. 
~·> H a ll , supra note 10, at 711-12. 
·''' Id. at 712. 
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There are often a number of ways to approach a particular medical 
problem, especially since details of presentat ion always differ from pa-
tient to patient. Flexible conventions, seiectively applied through the ex-
ercise of individual judgment, are the essence of ordinary medical prac-
tice, and can give rise to many alternative strategies for dealing with day-
to-day medical scenarios. A measui·ed and gradually escalating sequence 
of tests and interventions often represents the most acceptable course of 
action. In creating that sequence- contrary to Professor Elhauge's as-
sumption-the prevailing standard of care is capacious enough to include 
cases in which "high costs are not justified by minor expected benefits. "31 
A lthough Hall's story is not primarily about the use of cutting edge 
technologies, it presents a good example of the kind of decision-making 
at the margin-decision-making that invites "the prudent trimming of in-
crementally beneficial se rvices"
32
-that physicians must engage in when 
determining whether and how to use innovative drugs or treatments . But 
in order to make decisions a t the margins it is necessary to know where 
the margins are. Hall does not comment on the source or re liability of 
the probability estimates used in his anecdote . It is easy to devise num-
bers for use in a hypothetical , but only technology assessment can gener-
ate accurate data in a form that can be applied to real-life decision-
making. 
An arena in which sophisticated technology assessment has the poten-
tial to play an important role in the evolution of standards of medical 
practice is in the care of terminally ill and severely afflicted patients, es-
pecially among the elderly. Innovations in intensive care have repre-
sented genuine medical progress, but have also fomented grass-roots dis-
illusionment with prolonged, expensive and agonizing end-of-life inter-
ventions.33 This disillusionment has produced a more open public debate 
on the ethics of setting limits on care, which in turn has fueled shifts in 
concepts of death with dignity,
34 
a renewed emphasis on home and hos-
'' !d. a t 713. 
·'2 !d . at 712. 
' ·'See, e.g. , Geoffrey Cowle y & Ma ry Hager, Terminal Care: T oo Painful, Too 
Pro longed, Newsweek, D ec. 4 , 1995, a t 74 , 75 ; see a lso James Studnicki, David V. 
Schapira, Jon V. Straumfj ord, Robert A. Clark , J an Marshburn & Dennis C. Werner , A 
Nat ional Profile of the Use of Inte nsive Care by Medicare Patients with Ca nce r, 74 
Ca ncer 2366, 2368 (1994) (reporting findin gs that of 792 ,584 Medicare beneficiaries 
admitted with cancer in FY 1990, total Medicare charges were ove r $9.3 billion , of which 
$452.229,180 (4.9% of total) we re ICU charges). 
'"See, e.g., Paul Wilkes, The Next Pro-Lifers, NY. Times, July 21, 1996, § 6 (Magaz ine) , 
a t 22 , 24 (c iting an Apri11996 Gallup poll showing that 75% of Americans be lieve doctors 
sho uld be allowed to end th e Jives of termina ll y ill pati ents by painless means a t the 
patient 's request); see also Don Co lburn. US. Pati e nts' Dying Wishes Often Ignored: 
Stud y Finds Hospita l Care Depersonalized, Resis tant to Change , Wash. Post, Nov. 22, 
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pice car~ fo~ the dyin?, 35 and a change ~n medical co~ventions regar?in~ 
the apphcatwn and w1thdrawal of care fo r those neanng the end of hfe. · 
These changed attitudes can be expected to find expression in greater 
public and institutional acceptance of physician restraint and se lf-
regulation at the bedside. 
Once again, the practical fea sibility of physicians and families deciding 
to forgo heroic treatments depends critically on the availability of reliable 
information. Patients and doctors need sophisticated and trustworthy 
data about the patient's prospects for survival and recovery and about 
the efficacy, side effects and costs of the myriad interventions that are 
available to the gravely ill. Dr. William Knaus, at the University of Vir-
ginia Medical Center, has launched a groundbreaking techno logy assess-
ment project designed to look at just such parameters. D r. Knaus's com-
puter program and database, called APACHE, creates profiles of 
thousands of patients admitted to hospital intensive care units ("ICUs"), 
carefully records the types of treatments received, and tracks outcomes 
provided fo r patients with a spectrum of conditions and characteristics. 
The program then identifies the specific attributes of patients who benefit 
from placement in an ICU and from the interventions available in that 
setting. 37 Armed with this kind of information, families, physici ans, and 
patients can make more informed decisions about whether and when to 
opt for intensive care and when to forgo or terminate that option. Be-
cause individuals always differ somewhat from the populations profiled 
1995, a t Al. 
35 See Frankli n G. Miller & Joseph J . Fins, A Proposa l to Restructure H ospi ta l Ca re fo r 
Dying Patients, 334 New Eng. J. Med. 1740, 1741 (1996) (advocating restructuring care of 
hospitali zed dyin g pa tients by creating a hospice-like unit near the ICU th a t would 
e mphasize palliation , helping pa tients a nd famili es make decisions about appropriate e nd 
of life care); Sidney H. Wanzer e ta!. , The Physicia n 's Respons ibility to ward Hope lessly Ill 
Patients : A Second Look , 320 New Eng. J. Me d. 845-46 ( 1989) (advocating ho me and 
hospice ca re as alternatives to intensive hospitalization giving the dyin g pati e nt th e oppor-
tunity fo r pr ivacy, dignity and family close ness ). 
36 See, e.g., Danie l Callahan , Medica l Futility, Medical Necessi ty: The Proble m- Without-
A-Name, Hastings Ctr. Rpt ., July-Aug. 1991, at 30,34 (asserting "t hat some will want to 
ex tend th e not ion of [medica l] futility well beyo nd the persistent vege ta tive sta te to cases 
of severe dementia and multi -o rgan fa ilure "); Wanzer e t a!. , supra note 35 , a t 847-49 
(advocating use of pain relievers eve n if they sho rt e n life spa n and examining th e practice 
of assist ed suicide a nd euthanasia as occas ionally necessa ry final steps in a continuum of 
care for hopelessly ill patients). 
37 See Richard B. Becke r eta!. , The Use of A PACH E III to E va lua te ICU Le ngth of 
Stay, Resource Use , and Mor ta lity afte r Coro nary Artery By-Pass Surge ry, 36 J . Cardio-
vascular Surge ry 1 (1995); William A. Knaus e t a!. , The A PACHE III Prognosti c System: 
Risk Predic tion of H os pital Mortality for Critically Ill Hospitalized Adults, 100 Chest 161 9 
(1991); W illiam A. Knaus eta!. , An Evaluation of Outcome from Intensive Care in Major 
Medical Cente rs, 104 A nna ls Inte rna l Med. 410 (1986); David T. Wo ng & W illiam A. 
Knaus, Pred icting O utcome in Critical Care : The Current Sta tus of th e A PACHE 
Prognostic Scoring Sys tem , 38 Can. J. Anesthesia 374 (1991 ). 
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in a database, programs like APACHE can never entirely eliminate the 
risk and uncertainty surrounding care decisions, but they can help to 
greatly reduce the guesswork inherent in these difficult choices . Once 
again, patients and families may be more willing to make hard choices 
when they believe they are operating from sound knowledge rather than 
engaging in wholly uninformed speculation. Families prefer to face risks 
that are fa irly well known rather than of uncertain magni tude. A physi-
cian's ability to lay out the risks in a scientifically credible and precise 
manner tends to engender greater trust and confidence in the physician's 
judgment. T he value of the type of information generated by a program 
like A PACHE is not confined to cases in which heroic measures can be 
said to be entirely futile .38 Even in cases where patients may receive some 
minimal benefit-as where interventions may prolong life for days or 
even weeks- a more reliable projection may enable families and doctors 
to feel more comfortable forgoing intrusive or expensive treatments or 
concluding that continuing care carries intolerable costs in lost dignity 
and prolongation of suffering. 
The role proposed here for information technology as an aid to wise 
limits on care is potentially open to a number of objections. First, as Pro-
fessor Elhauge points out , information is a public good, and will tend to 
be in short supply in the private market unless access is restricted.39 If 
3~ Medical et hicis ts have engaged in a longstanding debat e about th e scope of th e 
concept of " futil e " medica l ca re , and whether accepted medical prac ti ce should exclude 
th e require me nt of offering futile care. Much of the debate stems from confus ion over the 
definition of futility. The term is sometimes used to re fer to care th a t is usually of no 
benefit , but may sometimes help in a few cases. Alternatively, it can be applied more 
narrowly to ca re that is be lieved to be of no benefit to a nyo ne . See, e .g., Jere my 
Sugarman, Talking About Futility, Hastings Ct r. Rpt., May-June 1996, at 41 (reviewing 
Lawrence J . Schneiderman & Nancy S. J ecke r, Wrong Medicine (1995)) (discussing 
various ways in which the term futility is vi ewed ); see a lso Ca lla han, supra no te 37 , at 31 
(discussing the di fficult y o f defining me dica l futility and th e distinction made between 
quan tita ti ve futilit y-defined as '"an expecta ti on of success th a t is e ither pred icta bl y or 
empiri ca ll y so unlikely th a t its exact probability is often incalculable"'-and qualitative 
futility- '"a ny treatme nt that mere ly preserves permanent unconsciousness or that fa il s to 
end to ta l dependence on inte nsive med ical care'") (quoting Lawrence J . Schneiderman, 
Nancy S. Jecker & Albert R. J anse n, Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical 
Implica ti o ns, 112 Annals Inte rnal Med. 949 , 950,952 (1 990)); Ma ry A. Crossley, Medical 
Futility and Disability Discrimination , 81 Iowa L. Rev. 179, 182-202 (1995) (disc uss ing th e 
parameters of the debate over medical futility); Nancy S. Jecker, Medical Futility and 
Care of Dying Pa ti en ts , 163 W. J . Med. 287 (1995) (descr ibing a " pat ien t-cen tered " 
definiti on of medi cal futility in which the measure is whether a give n trea tm e nt benefits 
the patient in a way he o r she can appreciate , as opposed to merely producing effects on 
organ systems or body parts). In a ny eve nt , the futility debate is littl e more than an 
abstract exercise unless it is possible to document with so me degree of accuracy the e ffects 
o f inte rven ti ons commonl y applied in end-of- life situa ti ons. That is the job of te chno logy 
assessment. 
·" See Elhauge, supra note 1, at 1574-75. 
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outcomes data are to be widely available, the government must get into 
the business of funding technology assessment projects, which could 
prove quite expensive if maintained at the level necessary to produce sig-
nificant effects. Second, this Comment assumes that non-academic prac-
titioners will make regular use of outcomes data in discussing treatment 
plans with their patients . It may be objected that this represents an unre-
alistic expectation, because it sets an unreachable standard for busy phy-
sicians. Most practicing doctors lack the time and the sophistication to 
become familiar with the complex details of the outcomes assessment lit-
erature. Understanding the significance of the technology assessment da-
ta and applying it to particular cases requires careful study and a pro-
longed investment of effort. For their part, patients cannot function ef-
fect ively as joint decision-makers unless they have at least a rudimentary 
appreciation for the scientific method and its application in the clinical 
setting, and are prepared to accept and assess uncertainty. Most impor-
tantly, the paradigm cannot work well unless both doctor and patient are 
comfortable with the idea that there is more than one reasonable ap-
proach to clinical problems, and are prepared to abjure the notion that 
proper medical care entails a single strategy of doing everything possible 
at any cost. 
There is some basis for believing that the medical profession is cur-
rently ill-equipped to make meaningful use of the kinds of information 
generated by technology assessment. Keeping up with, evaluating and 
applying the outcomes literature requires providers to devote more time 
to individual patients than is now generally available. The problem is 
likely to worsen as medical practice grows increasingly cost conscious and 
productivity pressures on physicians increase. 40 Assessing the significance 
of studies of new technologies also requires an understanding of statistics, 
epidemiology, and clinical trials design that may not be widespread 
among practitioners. Nevertheless, the explosion of knowledge and the 
greater sophistication of routine medical practice have made familiarity 
with the technology assessment literature, and the willingness and ability 
to share some of that knowledge with patients, vital components of good 
patient care. In educating physicians to meet this standard, too little at-
tention has been paid to the development of skills for assessing complex 
clinical research studies. The medical profession should place greater 
' 0 See generally Charles M. Barker III, Maximizing Efficiency in the Management of th e 
Physician Practice: Survival unde r Managed Care, J. Health Care Fin., Summer 1996, at 22 
(discussing the increased pressure to maximize revenue and control expenses placed on 
physicians by the growth of managed care); Robert Kuttner, Columbia/HCA and th e 
R esurgence of the For-Profit Hospital Business (First of Two Parts), 335 New Eng. J. 
Med. 362 (1996) (discussing th e medical, ethical and public policy issues raised by the 
resurge nce of for-profit hospitals). 
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emphasis on physician training in epidemiology, statistics, study design, 
and technology assessment.
41 
Also, the medical care system should intro-
duce reforms designed to encourage physicians to spend more time talk-
ing with patients and thinking about patients ' individual needs.42 Al-
though technology assessment cannot correct the misplaced priorities 
that create distorted incentives in these areas, these problems must be 
addressed if the information generated through technology assessment is 
to form a useful basis for hard choices. 
General skepticism about both the desirability and existence of bed-
side rationing also obstructs the promotion of technology assessment for 
its potential to encourage restraint in the consumption of medical care. 
As already noted, both top-down and physician-based rationing have 
been roundly criticized as a formula for inequity, injustice, and compro-
mise of patient interests.
43 
Payment structures believed to encourage phy-
sician-driven reductions in the level of care , including those that offer 
physicians direct financial incentives to minimize care, have come under 
fire as creating ethical conflicts of interest.
44 
Also, the physician-based 
model proposed here does nothing to alleviate the trans-systemic arbi-
trariness that is the central weakness of "grass-roots" rationing. 45 There 
is no doubt that serious inequities can result from decentralized and indi-
vidualized methods for allocating medical resources in a system where 
access to insurance, state-of-the-art facilities , and sophisticated, well-
informed care providers varies dramatically. Although the generation of 
" See generally William L. Roper, William Winkenwerder, Glenn M. Hackbarth & 
Henry Krakauer, Effectiveness In Health Care: An Initiative to Evaluate and Improve 
Medical Practice , 319 New Eng. J. Me d. 1197 (1988) (discussing the "effectiveness 
initiative " and the necessity for physicians to have th ese skills in order to cope with the 
complexities of modern practice). 
' 2 For sources noting this problem, see, e.g., Sherrie H. Kaplan & Lisa M. Sullivan , 
Maximizing the Quality of the Physician-Patient Encounter, 11 .1. Gen. Internal Med. 187, 
187-88 (1996) (arguing that the decreased duration and frequency of patient office visits 
for cost-containment purposes should be countered, in part , with increased training of 
physicians to maximize interpersonal contact with patients); A. James Lee & Janet B. 
Mitchell, Physician Reaction to Price Changes: An Episode-of-Care Analysis, Health Care 
Financing Rev., Winter 1994, at 65 (desc ribing the 1989 Medicare fee schedule reform as 
redressing the previous system's "ove rpay[ment]" ' of tec hnical procedures and 
"underpay[ment]" of office visits). 
' ·' See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text . 
.w See Orentlicher, supra note 11, at 162-63 (reviewing legislation and proposals to 
restrict th e use of payments to physicians, which are designed to induce them to reduce or 
limit medically necessary services); see also Woolhandle r & Himme lste in, supra note 18 , 
at 1706 (questioning the effectiveness of financial ince ntives in inducing physicians to limit 
care) ; cf. Robert Pear, U.S. Shelves Plan to Limit Rewards to H.M.O. Doctors, N.Y. 
Times , July 8, 1996, at AI (reporting on the Departme nt of Hea lth and Huma n Service 's 
decision to suspend th e enforcement of rules restricting HMOs' ability to use financial 
incentives to reward doctors for controlling the use and cost of medical care). 
' ' See Hall , supra note 10, at 714-19; Orentlicher, supra not e 11 , at 165. 
-- .; ~J "1 
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mtormation through technology assessment presents the potential for 
eventual consensus on the proper use of new technologies by offering a 
common factual foundation for decision-making, it does lit tle in itself to 
enforce comprehensive consistency in the use of medical resources, and 
may introduce new inequities through the misallocation of a key re-
source-information about the effects of treatment options-in favor of 
the well-informed and well-heeled. Although this Comment does not 
deal with the merits of these issues, it recognizes that accepting the role 
for technology assessment outlined here depends on endorsing a norma-
tive view of rationing as a not entirely undesirable feature of the medical 
care system, and on believing that the dangers posed by a system that 
routinely tolerates the sacrifice of potentially beneficial care can be 
minimized and controlled. 
Accepting the thesis of this Comment also depends on accepting the 
prediction that, all else being equal, the provision of outcomes informa-
tion will influence actual decision-making. W ill making the physician-
patient interaction better informed actually lead to a reduction in the 
consumption of medical care? That question must ultimately be an-
swered empirically. At this symposium, Professor Trebilcock suggested 
that a reduction in care will never materialize because rationing is a 
straightforward function of the economic pressures placed on the indi-
vidual doctor and patient; in the absence of direct financial incentives to 
conserve resources , collective action problems and self-interest will effec-
tively prevent rationing from occurring.46 That view is almost certainly 
too simplistic, because it discounts the possibility that conventions and 
norms influence medical practice, and that norms not only can persist 
without economic incentives in their favor but can even survive in the 
face of mild economic penalties. It also fails to take account of forces 
currently at work in some parts of the health care system that would tend 
to maintain pre-existing norms of medical practice that were shaped by 
the need to deal with scarcity.
47 
Those forces can have influence even 
outside the strongholds of cost-conscious medical practice (such as man-
aged care plans and HMOs) that reinforce them, and will tend to act as a 
counterweight to the absolutist norms and need-driven reimbursement 
systems (such as fee-for-service) that oppose any limits on care. The 
prevalence and existing modes of bedside rationing are thus unlikely to 
be a straightforward function of the direct economic incentives on indi-
vidual actors. Rather, they will be a complex product of a host of factors, 
which include (but are not limited to) the range and intensity of present 
'" Remarks of Michael Trebilcock at Olin/Virginia Law Re view Symposium , Mar. 1, 
1996. 
,; See supra notes 14-17 and accompan ying te xt. 
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cost pressures on physicians and patients system-\vide . 
So far, this Comment has focused on the role of technology assessment 
in enabling physicians to present options to patients more intell igently 
and effectively. Technology assessment can also work to undermine the 
absolutist paradigm by providing the basis for cost-shifting structures that 
exert direct pressure on patients to reduce the consumption of medical 
care. F amiliar devices, such as copayments and deductibles, al ready pro-
vide patients with some modest financial incentives to forgo or delay care 
in general, but do little to differentiate among different types of care. 
Technology assessment offers the possibility of applying cost-shifti ng de-
vices in more targeted ways. Better information would enable insurers to 
construct a graduated cost-shifting scheme in which reimbursement is 
tied to the value of available interventions. Such a cai ibrated system 
could attempt to discourage patients from consuming care with a higher 
cost-benefit ratio by shifting a greater portion of the costs of marginally 
effective or extraordinarily expensive new treatments to consumers. 
It would be impossible in practice to create a comprehensive schedule 
of financial incentives that precisely reflects the marginal costs and bene-
fits of the full range of care. Even if the methodological problems as-
sessing the costs and benefits of interventions could be solved,48 there are 
simply too many permutations to make that project fe asible .49 A more 
limited and achievable goal would be to attempt to discourage the over-
use of marginally effective services by establishing a purely forward-
looking system of graduated copayments or surcharges cove ring only new 
technologies or recently approved therapies, which tied the magnitude of 
coverage of costs fo r new services to their expected effects. As previ-
ously noted, a significant number of new drugs and treatments are costly 
but of low or questionable utility.
50 
As new technologies come along, an 
insurer or provider could evaluate the costs and review what is known 
about the expected magnitude and probability of benefits. The new 
treatment could be compared to previously available or less expensive 
alternatives . Based on these parameters, the insurer could then agree to 
cover some portion of the costs, with the rest being charged directly to 
the patient. The greater the benefit expected from the new intervention, 
the more complete the coverage, and the less the patient must pay di-
''See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. 
"
9 See Orent licher, supra note II, at 189 ("To rely exc lusively, or even primarily, on 
patie nt- based incentives (to ration care ] would require a degree of contract spec ificity that 
is not achievable in health care. For patients to agre e to less care in re turn fo r lower costs, 
they would have to be told exactl y wha t kinds of care and how muc h ca re they would 
receive at each premium level "'). 
;n See supra notes 20-25 and accompany ing text . 
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rectly. The result would be a schedule of cost-sharing that is tied closely 
to contemporaneous knowledge for experimental treatments like bone 
marrow transplantation, or new drugs like tP A for heart attacks or 
Tacrine for Alzheimer's disease. 51 Creating a system like the one pro-
posed would depend critically on detailed information gathered through 
technology assessment. 
To be sure, this proposal shares drawbacks with any approach that of-
fers patients direct financial incentives to avoid care. It is difficult to 
work out the terms by which cost-sharing can be combined with provid-
ing care to the poor. Any shift of costs directiy to patients makes the dis-
tribution of care more sensitive to ability to pay. Many new technologies 
will effectively be placed off-limits for the indigent or uninsured unless 
the government pays the full freight, which raises troublesome issues of 
horizontal equity by forcing decisions about what kinds of expensive care 
will be allocated directly to the poor. There are also enormous practical 
difficulties in formulating and implementing a service-by-service schedule 
of shared payments, even on a limited or prospective basis. Creating a 
graduated system would re9,uire establishing a workable and acceptable 
measure of medical benefit.'- Even if such a measure could be devised in 
principle, decisions in actual cases would require applying generalized 
findings gleaned from group studies to unique individuals-a process that 
doctors and patients might find intrusive or inept , especially when money 
is so directly at stake. 
On the other hand, efforts to tie a patient's share of payments for a 
new technology to projected benefits might prove more palatable to ab-
solutist watchdogs than other proposals for limiting care. For one thing, 
a shared payment paradigm might help bring about an important change 
51 For a discussion of these experimental treatments, see supra note 27 and accompany-
ing text. 
52 Profesor Eihauge has addressed the difficulties of trying to assign fungible "value" to 
medical benefit from many different kinds of treatments. See Elhauge, supra note 1 at 
1589-92; Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, supra note 8, at 1493-1526; see also 
Jan Paul Acton, Measuring the Monetary Value of Lifesaving Programs, Law & Contemp. 
Probs., Autumn 1976, at 46, 46-49 (arguing the need for an objective and readily 
applicable measure of benefit from medical procedures to facilitate a cost-benefit 
comparison between health and safety programs and other government programs); Maria 
A. Friedman, Issues in Measuring and Improving Health Care Quality, Health Care 
Financing Rev., Summer 1995, at 1, 4-9 (describing the difficulty in measuring quality and 
the need for a workable, uniform definition); Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard, 
Where Now For Saving Lives?, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1976, at 5, 11-15 
(employing use of "Quality Adjusted life Years" to determine efficient health resource 
allocation); Caitlin J. Halligan, Note, "Just What The Doctor Ordered": Oregon's 
Medicaid Rationing Process and Public Participation In Risk Regulation, 83 Geo. L.J. 
2697. 2712-13 (1995) (describing negative reaction to Oregon's use of a public survey to 
rank medical procedures for the purpose of creating a priority list of reimbursable 
treatment as part of Oregon's Medicaid Rationing Process). 
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in thinking about the allocation of medical care. Current coverage ar-
rangements foster an all-or-nothing approach to the use of medical tech-
nologies. Although an insurer's denial of payment or coverage is not the 
same as a rule barring a patient from obtaining care (since a patient can 
always choose to pay out-of-pocket for what is not covered), the two 
situations have converged in the minds of many participants in the health 
care system, adding fuel to the fire of absolutism. 53 That convergence is 
not surprising, in light of insurers' habit of sharply classifying all medical 
intervention into two categories: The medically necessary (which sweeps 
in treatme nts thought to offer any benefit whatsoever, however slight) 
and the unnecessary or futile (which is equated with no benefi t ). 5~ Once 
standard deductibles or copayments have been satisfied,55 care deemed 
"necessary" is customarily paid for at a fixed rate. That rate is insensitive 
to how effective a treatment is, or whether there are less expensive or vir-
tually equivalent alternatives. Treatments deemed " unnecessary" are ex-
cluded from coverage altogether. It is this bipolar approach that fosters 
the equation of coverage to care, and arouses resi stance to an insurer's 
refusal to pay even for the most expensive and marginally useful inter-
ventions on the ground that " medically necessary" care has been 
"denied. " Departing from a strictly categorical scheme that classifies all 
treatments as e ither "necessary" or "unnecessary" might help to lessen 
the resistance of consumers who are asked to pay more. Different medi-
5' See Elhauge, A llocating H eal th Care Mora lly , supra not e 8, at 1493-1526 (suggesting 
th a t refusal to pay is tantamount to an absolute prohibition on care) . 
5"See, eg, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(l)(A) (1994) (services no t pa rt of "reasonable and 
necessa ry" care exc luded fr om Medicare coverage) . In 1989, th e Hea lth Care Financing 
Adm inistra ti o n (" HCFA") defined a " necessa ry" service as one that " is safe, e ffective , 
non-investiga ti ona l, and app ropriate," and defined "appropri a te·· as mea ning that the 
service " is furnished in a setting commensura te with the pa ti ent's medical needs a nd 
cond ition, and furnished by qualified personne l. " Criteria and Procedures for Making 
Medi ca l Services Coverage Decisions That R ela te to Health Ca re Technologies, 54 Fe d. 
Reg. 4302, 4307, 4308 (1989) (proposed rul e) (ci ted in Maxwell J . Me hlm an , J effre y R . 
Botkin. Alan Scarrow, Amy Woodhall , Juli e Kass & Ellen Siebenschuh , Coverage of 
Gene tic T echnologies und er Na tiona l H ea lth R eform, 55 Am. J . Hum . Genet ics 1054, 
l 055 , 1060 ( 1994) ); see also Ca ll a han, supra note 36, at 33 (cr iti ciz ing previous a tt e mpts to 
define medicall y necessary care as opening the door to an unlimited ra nge of benefits 
rega rdless of cos ts and failin g to take into consideration th e efficacy of availabl e 
treatment); Note, supra note 52 , at 2706- 16 (descr ibing the Oregon Medicaid Rationing 
Process Commission's insiste nce on a fi xed minimal standard of esse ntial services). 
" For exa mple, Medicare be neficiar ies are charged a fix ed monthl y pre mium for 
insu rance under Med icare Pa rt 8 (which covers o utpati en t charges and serv ices). The 
program also pays for a fixed perce ntage (80%) of charges incurred und e r this Part. 
Under Part A, which covers in-hosp ital services, th e re is a ded uctibl e of about $600 , which 
th e pa ti en t pays out of pocket. The program pays a fixed amount pe r day for cha rges ove r 
and above th at amount. See U .S. Dep't of Hea lth & Human Se rvices, The Comple te 
Med icare Handbook 18-1 9, 34- 35 ( Euge ne La nday ed., 1990) (rev iewing Med ica re 
deduct ibles and reimbursement schedules). 
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cal strategies present a range of benefits and drawbacks, and are at-
tended by a spectrum of uncertain effects. It is truer to medical reality-
and may well prove more acceptable to absolutists-to adopt an ap-
proach that attempts to reflect the ongoing, dynamic state of knowledge 
about the value of care. 
A lthough the development of a truly complete understanding of the 
costs and benefits of medical care options is an ideal that may well be out 
of re ach for both practical and theoretical reasons, our current level of 
knowledge falls far short of the limits that may eventually be encoun-
tered. Technology assessment and outcomes research are in their in-
fancy , and their potential value in clarifying the most basic parameters of 
cost and benefit for new and existing interventions has only begun to be 
explored. We have a long way to go before diminishing returns set in , 
and are still at a stage in which serious efforts to chip away at large areas 
of ignorance could aid in the making of resource-saving choices. By 
showing that some risks are not as great as feared, nor some benefits as 
great as hoped for, technology assessment can help patients, families, and 
providers face up to hard decisions in planning care. T hese results can-
not be realized unless the medical community commits itself to technol-
ogy assessment that generates a broad range of reliable and useful infor-
mation. 
